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Abstract
Drawing on the notion of “faultlines” and the upper echelons perspective, we
argue that the gender faultline strength of a board of directors is negatively
related to strategic change. More interestingly, while gender faultline strength
negatively relates to strategic change under low levels of environmental
complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence, it is
positively related to strategic change when environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence are at high levels. The
analyses of panel data of 5781 ﬁrm-year observations of 1171 Chinese ﬁrms
provide support for the hypotheses.
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Why do some organizations initiate strategic change more than others?
Addressing this question, upper echelon scholars have linked upper echelon
characteristics to strategic change and performance metrics (Deutsch, 2005;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Post & Byron, 2015). More recently, two other
lines of research have addressed the topic of top executive team decisionmaking. In the diversity in teams’ literature, the argument is often made that
team diversity, in particular, top management team diversity is beneﬁcial for
innovation by providing informational resources (Van Knippenberg, 2017). In
this literature, team diversity is typically characterized by different ideas and
perspectives of team members possessing diverse backgrounds, experiences,
and knowledge (Nishii, Gotte, & Raver, 2007; Triana, Miller, & Trzebiatowski,
2014). Scholars who espouse demographic faultline theory, however, provide
a different argument. According to the faultlines in teams’ literature advanced
by Lau and Murnighan (1998), similarity within and across subgroups within
an overall team impacts ﬁrm strategic actions and innovation via facilitating or
impeding communication between subgroups. To capture demographic
similarity or dissimilarity between subgroups within an overall team, Lau and
Murnighan (1998) offered the notion of demographic faultlines which emphasizes the need to account for multiple demographic attributes at once. In
contrast to single characteristics that describe the demographic diversity of senior
management, faultline strength (FLS) captures the similarity within subgroups
while considering multiple demographic characteristics simultaneously.
The question thus arises whether it is team diversity or subgroup dynamics
related to demographic faultlines that more strongly drive strategic change,
which refers to the extent to which a ﬁrm modiﬁes its resource allocations to
meet changing business needs and sustain a competitive advantage (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978; Miller, 1991; Zhang, 2006). Examining strategic change
rather than ﬁnancial performance enables researchers to look more meticulously at the upper echelons and assess a dependent measure of a more
proximal nature (Richard, Wu, Markoczy, & Chung, 2019). Speciﬁcally,
concentrating on strategic change provides us the opportunity to craft
a parsimonious and tight theoretical model around a critical element of upper
echelons’ strategic choice and action (Andrevski, Richard, Shaw, & Ferrier,
2014; Nakauchi & Wiersema, 2015; Oehmichen, Schrapp, & Wolff, 2017;
Stewart & Amason, 2017). For this reason, given how much boards of directors vary in demography across ﬁrms, a board’s demographic composition
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has a notable inﬂuence on strategic change (Oehmichen et al., 2017; Triana
et al., 2014). Yet, previous research has not provided a clear answer as to what
upper echelons’ demographic factors play a signiﬁcant role in inﬂuencing
strategic change.
The discrepancy between the different arguments about the effects of the
top executive team on strategic change that are proposed in the team diversity
literature and the faultline literature may be partly due to different foci. Team
diversity research tends to concentrate on informational resources that a diverse team would provide, while the faultline research tends to focus on
subgroup similarity (cohesion) that impedes informational integration across
subgroups within the team. This study draws on the latter line of research
(controlling for the former) to consider ﬁrm strategic change as a dual problem
of similarity within subgroups (which increases the cohesion within subgroups) and cross-subgroup misalignment (CGAI) (which intensiﬁes intragroup conﬂict) within the team, taking external environmental factors into
account. That is, we employ the FLS construct as a ﬁne-grained measure that
simultaneously measures the degree of similarity within subgroups (subgroup
similarity) and the degree of dissimilarity across gender subgroups (team
diversity).
In this study, we focus on gender FLS speciﬁcally within the board of
directors (BODs) and its inﬂuence on strategic change (Finkelstein, Hambrick,
& Cannella, 2009), while accounting for other relevant demographic attributes
(e.g., age and educational level) consistent with previous scholarship (Lau &
Murnighan, 1998; Shaw, 2004) because of the following: (a) gender represents a clearly cut attribute which can be observed from group members; (b)
a group is split into several subgroups based on one characteristic (such as
gender), whether there will be a high level of similarity to other attributes for
the subgroups or not; and (c) the number of potential subgroups based on
gender alignment within the group. That is, a higher gender FLS indicates that
when splitting a group by gender, there will be a high similarity within each
subgroup (e.g., the subgroup consisting of women) while less similarity from
one subgroup to another (i.e., between the women subgroup and the men
subgroup). Below is an example of a group where we assess three demographic attributes: gender, age, and educational level. Gender faultlines
split a group into two subgroups, a male subgroup and a female subgroup. If
the male subgroup members are under 44 years old with master’s degrees,
while the female subgroup members are all PhDs more than 45 years old, the
alignment within subgroups is high (high level of similarity) while the
alignment between male and female subgroup is low (the two subgroups are
different), then we can conclude that the gender FLS in this sample is very
high (Chung et al., 2015; Lau & Murnighan, 1998, 2005).
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We focus on the BODs because research would consider this decisionmaking body as the “supra top management team” whose strategic actions
directly impact organizational outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Post &
Byron, 2015). Gender is equally important as a recent meta-analysis reveals
the strategic involvement role that women in BODs play along with men (Post
& Byron, 2015) which we argue has implications for strategic change.
However, because organizations are impacted by the industry context in which
they operate, the inﬂuence of BOD gender FLS on ﬁrm outcomes such as
strategic change should be inﬂuenced by external industry environments
(Chadwick, Way, Kerr, & Thacker, 2013). As suggested by recent faultline
scholarship (Cooper, Patel, & Thatcher, 2014; Richard et al., 2019), we
examine three industry-level environmental factors as important boundary
conditions (complexity, dynamism, and muniﬁcence) that inﬂuence the association between board gender FLS and strategic change. We believe such
a ﬁne-grained analysis will allow us to detect when gender faultlines might be
more or less salient with different implications for its impact on strategic
change. In fulﬁlling this goal, we identiﬁed China as an appropriate national
setting to examine the effect of gender faultlines and their interaction with
these industry-level environmental conditions on ﬁrm behavior. Therefore,
our empirical analyses were conducted using panel data of 5781 ﬁrm-year
observations of 1171 manufacturing ﬁrms from China characterized by
different levels of environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and
environmental muniﬁcence.

Theory and Hypotheses
BOD Gender FLS and its Impact on Strategic Change
The concept of faultlines was proposed to represent the alignment or misalignment of multiple attributes in a team that can result in subgroup formation
(Bezrukova, Jehn, Zanutto, & Thatcher, 2009; Lau & Murnighan, 1998). Prior
studies have shown that faultlines are a strong predictor of group dynamics
because they create the possibility that the group will split into subgroups on
various dimensions (Chung et al., 2015). Our approach focuses on gender
while simultaneously considering the relevance of other demographic attributes. For instance, suppose that in a six-person team, there are three men
and three women. The three men all come from engineering backgrounds,
whereas the three women all come from marketing backgrounds. Within the
male subgroup, men are all similar with respect to age (mid 60s), nationality
(white American), and educational level (bachelor’s degrees). In contrast,
within the female subgroup, women are similar to each other in terms of age
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(mid 40s), nationality (Asian American), and educational level (master’s
degrees). In this case, gender FLS would be greater because, in addition to the
men/women split on the team, there is homogeneity within each of the
subgroups and differences between the subgroups. This implies that members
in a subgroup based on a sociocultural attribute, such as gender, share similar
social and historical identities. In other words, higher gender FLS indicates
that the men are similar to each other in age, nationality, and educational level,
and the women are also similar to each other in terms of age, nationality, and
educational level, while the men and women have fewer attributes in common
as it relates to age, nationality, and educational level.
The aforementioned example highlights the importance of simultaneously
assessing the degree of similarity within subgroups and dissimilarity across
subgroups. A more precise gender-based faultline has been proposed by Shaw
(2004) to consist of two dimensions. The ﬁrst dimension is subgroup internal
alignment which measures the cohesion within subgroups and focuses on how
similar members of the same subgroup are (Thatcher, Jehn, & Zanutto, 2003),
while the second dimension is CGAI or the reciprocal of cross-subgroup
alignment which measures the extend of difference among members across
subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2009). The degree of faultline is the product of
subgroup internal alignment and CGAI. While subgroup internal alignment
signiﬁes the extent to which all individuals within a subgroup are similar to
one another on all other relevant demographic characteristics (Tuggle,
Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010), CGAI denotes the extent to which subgroups formed along the faultline diverge (Van Peteghem, Bruynseels, &
Gaeremynck, 2018). Each dimension captures a different aspect of a team.
Compared with other attributes (e.g., age, tenure, educational level, functional
background, and nationality), gender better satisﬁes three criteria with respect
to the ideal attribute to assess FLS in terms of observability, high level of
similarity within subgroups, and high dissimilarity across subgroups.
The academic evidence has demonstrated that demographic faultlines
conceptually support subgroup dynamics within a team and more accurately
predict team outcomes than those found for demographic diversity alone
(Bezrukova, Thatcher, & Jehn, 2007; Thatcher & Patel, 2012). Thus, it is
critical to explore how faultlines within the upper echelons inﬂuence strategic
decision-making. We propose that BOD gender FLS will negatively affect
strategic change for two reasons. First, a high similarity within the female
(male) subgroup is likely to increase communication within a subgroup due to
similarity attraction (Byrne, 1971), which unfortunately reduces communication across subgroups (Sawyer, Houlette, & Yeagley, 2006; Van Knippenberg,
Dreu, & Homan, 2004). Although high similarity within gender subgroups has
the potential to improve within-subgroup interactions among the women or
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among the men due to similarity-attraction bias (Byrne, 1971), they could also
result in reduced communication across the male and female subgroups within
the board (Sawyer et al., 2006; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). Second, a high
misalignment between the male versus the female subgroup can result in
relationship conﬂict and tension (Choi & Sy, 2010; Chung et al., 2015;
Lincoln & Miller, 1979). Conﬂicts increase difﬁculty agreeing on a course of
action and, therefore, less strategic change and tension is a consequence of
conﬂict or lack of communication between subgroups within the board when
gender FLS is strong (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Simons & Peterson, 2000).
This is more serious for supra top executives comprising the BODs who rely
on their knowledge, largely inﬂuenced by their personal characteristics, to
process information, and inﬂuence ﬁrm strategy (Deutsch, 2005; Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). In short, subgroup cohesion intensiﬁes intergroup conﬂict
(Bezrukova et al., 2007; Li & Hambrick, 2005; Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, &
Kim, 2006), and CGAI negatively impacts intergroup trust and respect
(Cronin, Bezrukova, Weingart, & Tinsley, 2011; Harrison & Klein, 2007) and
information sharing (Richard et al., 2019; Van Peteghem et al., 2018). This
leads to more difﬁculty making agreements on strategic change with respect to
reconﬁguring key resource allocations for changing market demands and
competitive advantages (Tuggle et al., 2010). Controlling for any BOD diversity effects, we introduce the following gender FLS hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: BOD gender FLS will be negatively related to strategic
change.
Next, we examine three moderating conditions under which the negative
effects of BOD FLS on strategic change can be attenuated.

The Moderating Role of Environmental Context
The environment is one of the most relevant factors that upper echelon cohorts
have to contend with (Atinc & Ocal, 2014; Goll & Rasheed, 1997), so we ﬁnd
it necessary to not only examine BOD FLS effects on strategic change but also
to study this relationship within the environmental context. Upper echelons
theory presumes that a ﬁrm’s executives make strategic choices by using their
cognitive ﬁlters to process information from the environment (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984). Moreover, executives process information from the environment through their perceptions, interpretations, cognitive schemas, and
values, which are shaped by the executives’ demographic backgrounds and
experiences that represent the knowledge they possess. We draw upon the
established typology by Dess and Beard (1984) which presents the following
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three relevant environmental aspects: environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence. Indeed, ﬁrms operating in
complex, dynamic, and/or muniﬁcent environments require signiﬁcant input
from the BODs (Atinc & Ocal, 2014). Given the importance of BODs for
effective strategic decision-making and changes (Deutsch, 2005), we speciﬁcally outline below how each of these three environmental factors independently moderates the negative relationship between BOD gender FLS
and strategic change.
Environmental complexity. Viewing environmental complexity from the upper
echelons perspective, we deﬁne it as the number and diversity of factors (e.g.,
especially competitors) and components in the macro environment that BODs
must deal with in addition to the relationships among external factors they
must understand to formulate and implement strategy (Tung, 1979). Possession of high-quality board members becomes critical in a highly competitive, complex environmental context. Decision-making with regards to
strategic change in such a context requires high levels of information processing and synchronized coordination among competent board members
(and across gender subgroups comprising the faultline) to cope and maintain
competitiveness (Dess & Beard, 1984; Sharfman & Dean, 1991). When
a team (i.e., BOD) operates under high environmental complexity, high
collaboration among members is essential because board decisions are then
able to beneﬁt from a variety of views and evaluation of various perspectives
to arrive at high-quality solutions (Boone, Van Olffen, Van Witteloostuijn, &
de Brabander, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Nyberg & Ployhart, 2013).
We propose that gender faultlines in BODs likely contribute to strategic
change under high environmental complexity as those environments demand
information sharing across subgroups and cross-fertilization of ideas (Cooper
et al., 2014). Increased environmental complexity stemming from external
demands should be matched with a more complex management approach that
must coordinate its operations effectively and efﬁciently (Dervitsiotis, 2012).
Furthermore, numerous demands prevalent in complex environments tend to
increase the importance and urgency that subgroup contributions are exchanged across gender-based subgroups within the board to facilitate strategic
change (Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). This urgency for information exchange in complex environments emphasizes the need for
positive subgroup distinctiveness which will likely mitigate bias and reduce
unhealthy interactions between gender-based subgroups within the BOD
(Cooper et al., 2014; Van Knippenberg et al., 2004). In other words, when the
BOD needs information, subgroup differences should be seen as an opportunity more so than a threat. When BODs operate under high environmental
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complexity, we expect the sharing of relevant information across genderbased subgroups, which results in a more complex team cognitive infrastructure and improved decision-making than BODs operating under low
environmental complexity.
Speciﬁcally, under conditions of low environmental complexity, subgroups
based on strong gender-based faultlines will not likely beneﬁt from crossgender information sharing because the simplicity of the environment will
likely reduce communication across gender subgroups and decrease the
likelihood of strategic change (Cooper et al., 2014). Research shows that
similarity-attraction effects are very strong in teams (Byrne, 1971), whereby
people are comfortable interacting with others who are similar to themselves
unless the context encourages them to do otherwise. Low environmental
complexity is less likely to require gender subgroups comprising the faultline
to demonstrate unique contributions to the BOD, and this can result in less
strategic change. Thus, controlling for any BOD diversity main effects, we
propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between BOD gender FLS and
strategic change will be accentuated for ﬁrms competing under low environmental complexity but attenuated for ﬁrms competing under high
environmental complexity.
Environmental dynamism. Environmental dynamism, deﬁned as the magnitude
and frequency of environmental change, will also likely inﬂuence the strength
of the relationship between BOD gender FLS and strategic change (Cooper
et al., 2014; Miller, Ogilvie, & Glick, 2006). High environmental dynamism
requires more strategic change in order to meet changing business conditions,
and therefore, companies in such contexts could bridge across gender subgroups when a strong faultline exists on the BOD compared to ﬁrms operating
under low environmental dynamism.
Prior research shows that settings of high environmental dynamism unlock
executives’ strategic decision-making potential (Yamak, Nielsen, & EscribaEsteve, 2014) as executives must rely on a broad pool of information to
effectively manage the ﬁrm in a turbulent context (Gordon, Stewart Jr., Sweo,
& Luker, 2000). We propose that strong gender-based faultlines can provide
advantages to boards by presenting useful perspectives that can help ﬁrms’
executives make strategic changes to remain competitive (Milliken & Lant,
1991; Yamak et al., 2014). Men and women have differing life experiences
and perspectives that can be useful to BODs or executives who need to make
decisions to meet the changing business needs of diverse customers. Again,
research on team dynamics shows that when differences are seen by the team
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as a source of advantage, diverse teams perform better than when that is not
the case (Van Dick, Van Knippenberg, Hägele, Guillaume, & Brodbeck,
2008). Thus, under high environmental dynamism, all sources of information,
including those which can be derived from gender-based faultlines on boards,
can be valuable.
Meanwhile, in environments with low environmental dynamism, there
should be less need for knowledge exchange to quickly react to changing
market conditions. Speciﬁcally, there would be less impetus for strategic
change and for a BOD with gender faultlines to present various perspectives.
This would not be as critical under low environmental dynamism because
market conditions change more slowly. As such, we posit that under low
environmental dynamism, gender FLS can result in more tension between the
subgroups and less information exchange because the ﬁrm is not pressed for
information and quick change. Research has shown that demographic
faultlines are linked with less information exchange on BODs (Tuggle et al.,
2010), and that in the absence of an urgent need to collaborate with those who
are different than you, the default human tendency is to spend time with those
who are similar and familiar (Byrne, 1971). Thus, our prediction is that gender
FLS will be associated with less strategic change in contexts of low environmental dynamism than contexts of high environmental dynamism because
unique differences between board members may not be required or appreciated in such an environmental context. Controlling for any BOD diversity
main effects, we propose:
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between BOD gender FLS and
strategic change will be accentuated for ﬁrms competing under low environmental dynamism but attenuated for ﬁrms competing under high
environmental dynamism.
Environmental muniﬁcence. Finally, we propose that environmental muniﬁcence will also serve as a moderator because the abundance or scarcity of
resources can have an impact on the degree to which gender FLS inﬂuences
strategic change. Research shows that demographic faultlines are associated
with less communication and information processing in BODs (Tuggle et al.,
2010). However, regardless of these dynamics, some environments are more
conducive to change than others given available resources. Even BODs with
the best intentions of making strategic change may not do so if their context is
such that they have no resources. To the contrary, resources encourage change,
innovation, and competition.
Contexts with low environmental muniﬁcence are resource scarce and lack
opportunities (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Park & Mezias, 2005; Shepherd, Patzelt,
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& Baron, 2013), while those with high environmental muniﬁcence have more
abundant growth and access to resources. Under high environmental muniﬁcence, members of BODs have more opportunity to recommend business
initiatives and directions without severe resource constraints, which would
allow for more strategic choices and allocations of resources to pursue
business strategy (Bloom & Michel, 2002; Messersmith, Lee, Guthrie, & Ji,
2014). High environmental muniﬁcence provides BOD members with greater
room to present ideas and suggest changes. Because a resource-rich environment is associated with high growth (Dess & Beard, 1984), gender
faultlines on the BOD could lead to more strategic change as members of the
upper echelons have more discretion to initiate change and present new ideas
based on their interpretation of business conditions (Hambrick & Finkelstein,
1987; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Under muniﬁcent environments, a ﬁrm’s
competitors would also be pursuing new strategies for innovation and growth,
which would give the upper echelons an impetus to keep up. Under such
conditions, the opportunities and resources present under high environmental
muniﬁcence should facilitate gender-based subgroups on a BOD to make
contributions to the strategic decision-making process (Cooper et al., 2014;
Van Knippenberg et al., 2004) either within or across subgroups of the BOD.
Thus, perspectives shared as a result of BOD gender faultlines will be more
likely to result in strategic change than what may happen under low environmental muniﬁcence where resources are fewer and ﬁrms may not be able to
carry out new initiatives even if they wanted to do so.
In a low muniﬁcence environment, the context limits strategic choice and
directors will have fewer options to suggest change (Karaevli, 2007). In such
an environment, strategic change could be particularly important, but without
resources, a ﬁrm may not be capable of implementing strategic changes
anyway. Moreover, research shows that being under strain, such as when
a ﬁrm is lacking resources or has not been performing well, narrows a team’s
capacity to think outside the box and process new information (Staw,
Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Instead of exploring new opportunities,
most teams that are under stress turn to old and tested ways of doing things and
jettison tasks that are nice to have since only the most essential functions
receive priority (Karau & Kelly, 1992; Kelly & Loving, 2004). Teams under
stress have also been found to have lower team and individual performance
because learning is inhibited (Savelsbergh, Gevers, Heijden, & Poell, 2012).
Therefore, controlling for any BOD diversity main effects, we predict that
BODs that possess strong gender faultlines operating in low environmental
muniﬁcence settings will be related to fewer strategic changes.
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Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between BOD gender FLS and
strategic change will be accentuated for ﬁrms competing in low environmental muniﬁcence settings but attenuated for ﬁrms competing in high
environmental muniﬁcence settings.

Method
Data and Sample
To test the hypotheses, we compiled a panel dataset of Chinese companies
publicly listed on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We extracted BOD’s demographic characteristics during the 2008–
2018 period from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research
(CSMAR) database, a reliable data provider which focuses on Chinese
publicly listed companies on the stock exchange, ﬁrm-level ﬁnancial information (e.g., total debt, total assets, advertising expenses, and inventories)
from CSMAR’s Corporate Financial Statements and Corporate Financial
Index Analysis sub-databases, and ﬁrm-level variables (e.g., number of
employees, foreign ownership, and state ownership) from Stock Market
Trading, Corporate Stockholder, Corporate Governance Structure, and Corporate Characters Features sub-databases, respectively, but in the same period.
Our ﬁnal sample included 1175 Chinese ﬁrms with 5781 ﬁrm-year observations in the period 2008–2018. We lagged all the explanatory variables
by 1 year (i.e., independent variables were measured at year t and the dependent variable at year t + 1).

Dependent Variable
Strategic change (time t + 1). Following similar prior studies (Richard et al.,
2019; Triana et al., 2014), we measured strategic change of a ﬁrm with
a composite measure consisting of six critical resource indicators: ﬁnancial
leverage, non-production overhead, advertising intensity, plant and equipment
newness, research and development intensity, and inventory level. Speciﬁcally, ﬁnancial leverage is proxied by total debt/total assets; non-production
overhead by selling, general, and administrative expenses/net sales; advertising intensity by the ratio of advertising expense divided by net sales, plant
and equipment newness by net plant, and equipment/gross plant and
equipment; inventory levels by the ratio of inventories divided by net sales;
and research and development intensity by the ratio of R&D expenditures
divided by net sales. The information for these variables was extracted from
COMPUSTAT. In line with prior studies (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1990;
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Triana et al., 2014), we ﬁrst calculated the absolute values of the differences in
each index between the prior year and the current year and then calculated the
average value and the SD of this difference. Next, we standardized the absolute value of difference for each index. We then averaged the six standardized values to arrive at a composite of strategic change. The mean value of
strategic change of the sampled ﬁrms is .00 with a SD of .31, which is
consistent with Zhang (2006).

Independent Variable
Our independent variable is BOD gender FLS measured at time t. We deﬁned
BOD membership by considering senior BOD members (e.g., the chair of the
board and key BOD members that directly report to the chair). A board in our
sample contains, on average, 10 BOD members yearly. We acquired BOD
information from the Listed Firm’s Figure Characteristic database in CSMAR.
Consistent with our conceptualization, we calculated gender FLS as the
product of internal subgroup alignment (IA) and the reciprocal of crosssubgroup alignment (1  CGAI). The general formula is: FLS = IA × (1 
CGAI). Speciﬁcally, we ﬁrst identify the gender subgroup for each BOD: the
value is 1 if gender is man and 2 if gender is woman.
Within each subgroup, it is important to consider other important attributes
that can impact the board’s strategic decision-making, such as educational
level, tenure on the board, nationality, and functional background
(Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye, 2012a). Therefore, we calculate other attributes
as follows. For the educational level category, the value is 1 if educational
level is below associate degree, 2 if educational level is associate degree, 3 if
educational level is undergraduate degree, 4 if educational level is master’s
degree, and 5 if educational level is doctorate degree. For the age category, the
value is 1 if age is less than 30 years, 2 if age is equal to or greater than 30 years
but less than 44 years, and 3 if age is greater than 44 years. For the tenure
category, the value is 1 if tenure on board (measured in months) is less than 12,
2 if tenure on the board is equal to or greater than 12 but less than 30, 3 if
tenure on the board is equal to or greater than 30 but less than 60, 4 if tenure on
the board is equal to or greater than 60 but less than 120, and 5 if tenure on the
board is greater than or equal to 120. For the BOD functional category, the
value is 0 if the functional background is executive and 1 if not. For the
nationality category, the value is 1 if nationality is Chinese and 2 if not.
Consistent with prior studies (e.g., Shaw, 2004), we calculated IA by ﬁrst
generating three elements: observed alignment, perfect alignment, and
nonalignment. Observed alignment (IAm/age/obs) is to measure the distance
between actual gender alignment and random distribution in each category
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(e.g., age); perfect alignment (IAm/age/perfect) describes the situation where the
same gender members belong to the same subgroup category (e.g. all men
belong to the same subgroup age ≥44 years); nonalignment (IAm/age/nonalign)
describes the situation where people are distributed evenly in each category.
The difference between observed alignment and nonalignment is calculated
(i.e., IAm/age/obs  IAm/age/nonalign), which is called “alignment difference,” and
the difference between perfect alignment and nonalignment is also calculated
(i.e., IAm/age/perfect  IAm/age/nonalign), which is called “maximum difference,”
separately for the male and female groups. IA for the male (female) group is
then calculated as the ratio of male (female) “alignment difference” divided by
male (female) “maximum difference.” The overall value of gender IA is: (male
IA + female IA)/2. Taking an example of age as the subgroup category for the
male group, the equation to calculate the observed male alignment across age
categories (IAm/age/obs) could be described as: IAm/age/obs = Σ(Omi – Emi)2/Emi,
where Omi is the actual observed male number in the i-th category of age
category, Emi is the expected number of men in the i-th age category if there is
random distribution, and i = 1,2,3 because we have three categories for age.
The only difference between perfect alignment and observed alignment is the
value of Omi. If we assume all men are less than 30 years old, Om1 equals the
total number of men, and Om2 and Om3 equal zero. Then, the perfect alignment
(IAm/age/perfect) for men can be calculated. Similarly, the value of Omi for
nonalignment is the remainder plus the quotient of the number of men divided
by the number of categories. In other words, if there are three men, Om1 =
Om2 = Om3 = 3/3 = 1. But if there are four men, the quotient is one with
a remainder of one, which indicates Om1 = 2 and Om2 = Om3 = 1. Then, the
nonalignment for men (IAm/age/nonalign) can be calculated. Next, the
maximum difference (MaxDiff) is calculated as MaxDiff = IAm/age/perfect 
IAm/age/nonalign. Thus, the value of IA for male alignment across age categories
is calculated as IAmales/age = (IAm/age/obs  IAm/age/nonalign)/MaxDiff. We can
get IA for female alignment across age categories (IAfemales/age) in the same
way. Finally, the value of IA for gender across age is calculated as IA gender/age =
(IA males/age + IA females/age)/2. If we repeat the above process for other
attributes (nationality, educational level, functional background, and tenure)
and take an average of the total value, we will get an average overall genderbased internal alignment index IAgender = (IAgender/age + IAgender/nationality +
IAgender/education + IAgender/function + IAgender/tenure)/5. The range of IA is from
0 to 1. A higher value of IAgender indicates there is a high level of similarity
within the male group and within the female group. If IAgender = 1, it indicates
all the men are exactly alike and all women are exactly alike.
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CGAI is described as “the cross-product (CP) approach uses frequency
counts of subgroup members in each attribute category and provides an index
of the extent to which there are ‘matchups’ between subgroup members in
each category” (Shaw, 2004, p. 74). It has two components: CPs and normalized weight (Wt) for each CP pair. CP calculates the “matchups” (for
example, the men older than 44 years old with the women older than 44 years
old is a matchup under the three categories of age) between subgroup
members using mathematical combination by three steps: (1) to calculate the
product of the number of people in each matchup and sum them up, (2) to
calculate the number of people in the subgroup which contains the matchup
pair, and (3) to calculate CP for each pair by the ratio of the values in step one
divided by the values in step two. Wt indicates the weight for each matchup
based on the number of people in the subgroups by three steps: (1) to calculate
the product value with the number of people in the subgroups which contains
the matchup, that is, the second step to calculate CP as mentioned above, (2) to
sum up the value of step one in all potential subgroups, and (3) calculate Wt
for each pair by the ratio of values in step one divided by the values in step
two. For two subcategories such as gender category (men vs. women), the
matchups belong to male and female groups, while the potential group
subgroups are also the male and female groups, thus Wt = 1. After calculating
the CP and Wt for each pair, we will get CGAI for each pair by the product
value of CP and Wt, that is, CGAIpair = CP × Wt. Then, we will get CGAI
across certain attributes by adding each pair’s CGAI together. After repeating
the calculation for other attributes (e.g., nationality, educational level, functional
background, and tenure), we obtain the values of CGAI for each other attribute
and the average overall gender-based cross-subgroup alignment index
CGAIgender = (CGAIgender/age + CGAIgender/nationality + CGAIgender/education +
CGAIgender/function + CGAIgender/tenure)/5. The range of CGAI is from 0 to 1,
while 0 represents low alignment across subgroups and 1 represents high
alignment across subgroups.
Finally, we get gender-based faultline strength as FLSgender = IAgender ×
(1  CGAIgender). The range of FLSgender is from 0 to 1. Higher values of FLS
mean higher values of IA and lower values of CGAI. In other words, if
FLSgender = 1, all men are exactly alike and all women are exactly alike, but
men and women have no attributes in common. If FLSgender = 0, every man
has different age, nationality, educational level, functional background, and
tenure, and there is the same situation with all women, but each man shares the
same attributes with a woman. The minimum BOD gender FLS in our sample
is 0, and the maximum BOD gender FLS is .48.
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Moderators
Environmental complexity (time t). Following prior studies (Cooper et al., 2014;
Dess & Beard, 1984), we measured environmental complexity as a fourdimensional measure consisting of the following: (1) the Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman index (HHI), (2) the four-ﬁrm concentration index (Firm-4), (3)
the eight-ﬁrm concentration index (Firm-8), and (4) establishment diversity
(i.e., the number and distribution of small, medium, and large organizations).
We derived the calculation of each dimension using the same approach as
Tirole (1988) and Cooper et al. (2014) (a) by computing HHI as one minus the
sum of the squared
market shares for all ﬁrms in a 3-digit industry code (i.e.,
P
HHI ¼ 1  ni¼1 a2i , where n represents number of ﬁrms in an industry and ai
indicates the ﬁrm i’s market share, i ¼ 1,…,n); (b) by computing concentration index of Firm-4 (Firm-8) as 100 minus, the sum of the market shares
held by the four (eight) largest competitors. In other words, after every ﬁrm in
an industry was ranked from the largest market share to the smallest market
share and numbered from 1 to n, we could get the Firm-4
P4 and Firm-8 per the
following
equations:
Firm

4
index
¼
100

1 ai ; Firm  8 index ¼
P
100  48
1 ai , where ai indicated the ﬁrm i’s market share. Higher values of
HHI, Firm-4 and Firm-8 mean higher levels of competition; and (c) by
computing establishment diversity by the
(Cooper et al.,
P following
Pm equation
2
2
2014): Establishment diversity ¼ 1  m
j EI =ð
j Ei Þ , where E is the
number of establishments in industry i and m is the number of establishments
in small-, medium-, and large-size classes, respectively. The high value of
Cronbach alpha (.85) suggests the internal consistency of the four dimensions
and good scale reliability for this measure.
Environmental dynamism (time t). This variable, representing the rate of unpredictable change in a ﬁrm’s industry, was computed following Keats and
Hitt (1988) and Pathak, Hoskisson, and Johnson (2014). We ﬁrst logtransformed yearly industry gross revenues and then regressed it at time
t1 against time t2, t3, t4, and t5. Through this process we obtained
the regression slope’s standard error and utilized that value as environmental
dynamism (Richard et al., 2019). A large standard error indicates a high level
of dynamism.
Environmental muniﬁcence (time t). Environmental muniﬁcence is proxied by
the industry-year growth rate, which is calculated as industry-wide percentage
change in revenues from time t1 to t2 (Ferrier, 2001; Richard, Murthi, &
Ismail, 2007). We obtained the industry-level revenues for each year during
the study period (2008–2018) and calculated the change of industry revenues
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by subtracting the industry-level revenue at year t1 from the industry-level
revenue at year t. The difference was then divided by industry-level revenue at
year t  1 to arrive at the percentage of change to proxy industry muniﬁcence.
The mean value of this variable is .21 with a SD of .23, which is consistent
with Ferrier’s study in 2001.

Control Variables
We included several control variables measured at time t to control for factors
which may inﬂuence the dependent variable, strategic change. First, we
controlled for past strategic change (strategic change at time t). Second, ﬁrm
size impacts strategic change (Greve, 2011; Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, & Covin, 2000). We thereby controlled for ﬁrm
size and measured it as the logarithm of the number of employees consistent
with Zhang (2006) who found a negative correlation between this speciﬁc
operationalization of ﬁrm size and strategic change. Third, we included ﬁrm
age as a control variable because previous studies have found that it affects
strategic change (Barron, West, & Hannan, 1994). Following prior studies,
we measured ﬁrm age as the earliest year between initial public offering year
and earliest data accessed year. Then, we also controlled for CEO variables
which can inﬂuence strategic change, including CEO age and CEO tenure
(Shi, Hoskisson, & Zhang, 2017). We calculated CEO tenure using the period
from the time an executive took the CEO position to the present. We also
included CEO ownership, which was measured as the ratio of the value of
shares held by the CEO divided by the market value of total shares of the ﬁrm.
Low levels of CEO ownership are important for a more transparent and
rigorous corporate governance because BOD members may prefer to work
closely regardless of the presence of a faultline when they have less power
relative to the CEO resulting in weaker faultlines with strong implications for
strategic change. We extracted the information about the value of shares held
by the CEO at the end of the reporting period from the Corporate Governance
sub-database of CSMAR and the market value of the ﬁrm from the Stock
Trading sub-database.
We also controlled for BOD size and several types of BOD heterogeneity
(BOD nationality, age, educational level, functional background, and tenure
heterogeneity).1 BOD size was measured as the number of board members for
the ﬁrm each year. We extracted BOD attribute information from the general
information of Listed Firm’s Figure Characteristic in CSMAR. Following
prior studies (Triana et al., 2014), we adopted Blau’s index to calculate BOD
nationality heterogeneity, BOD educational level heterogeneity,
P and BOD
functional background heterogeneity, which is speciﬁed as: 1 pi2, where pi
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is the proportion of subgroup members in the entire group number of members
with each attribute in a BOD. For the continuous measures, BOD age heterogeneity and BOD tenure heterogeneity, we used the coefﬁcient of variation.
Moreover, we controlled potential year effects (2008–2018) by generating
year dummy variables and included them in the analyses. Finally, because the
sampled ﬁrms come from 29 industries from C13 to C42 in the manufacturing
industry at the 3-digit level, we generated a set of industry dummy variables
and included them in the analyses.

Econometric Model
Our panel data are in the structure of yearly repeated observations per ﬁrm
over the period, which makes ordinary regression models inappropriate and
requires an appropriate econometric model. The ﬁxed and random effects are
the most suitable models for analyzing the panel data because they account for
the unobserved effects and partially solve for an endogeneity concern. To
decide whether a ﬁxed- or random-effects model was more appropriate, we
conducted Hausman’s (1978) speciﬁcation test, and the results of the
Hausman test were signiﬁcant (χ 2 = 1265.66, p = .000), suggesting that
a ﬁxed-effects model is preferred. Thus, we used the ﬁxed- effect model in the
analyses.
One concern might be that time-speciﬁc factors such as government interventions or economic downturns might affect strategic change—an
omitted-variable issue (Certo & Semadeni, 2006). To address this concern,
we included a set of year dummy variables in our panel data model with a large
N (number of ﬁrms) and a relatively small T (time periods), which has proved
to be useful in reducing the inﬂuence of contemporaneous correlation
(Baltagi, 2008). Another concern is strategic change may affect BOD gender
faultline characteristics. For example, a ﬁrm with high strategic change may
be more inclined to add BOD members who differ from the current directors,
and thus, BOD faultlines might be partially affected. To address this concern,
we lagged the dependent variable 1 year after all the explanatory variables to
account for reverse-causality effects. That is, in testing for the main effects of
BOD gender FLS on strategic change, we regressed the dependent variable,
strategic change at year t + 1 (e.g., 2009), on the independent variables (e.g.,
BOD gender FLS) at year t (e.g., 2008).

Correcting for Endogeneity
The endogeneity problem arises if the true value of independent variables that
correlate to both the dependent variable and one or more independent
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variables is hidden. To address this concern, we constructed the independent
variables from annual reports and obtained top management team (TMT)
information from CSMAR, so the errors-in-variables issue is less likely. As
noted above, we controlled several alternative explanatory variables in the
analyses to eliminate the omitted-variable bias. As such, our focus is to tackle
the simultaneous causality concern regarding plausible effects from performance to BOD gender faultlines. That is, BOD gender faultlines could be
endogenous to strategic change.
We correct for endogeneity related to contemporaneous reverse causality in
several ways. First, as noted above, we lagged the independent variable at time
t1 (i.e., the independent variables at year t1 and the dependent variable at
year t) to reduce the possibility of reverse causality. Second, we assessed the
exogeneity of BOD gender faultlines by conducting the Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (note: H0: the BOD gender faultlines are exogenous). The syntax in
Stata is -xtivreg2-. The results with nonsigniﬁcant chi-square tests of the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (chi-square = .57, p = .450) cannot reject H0. This
suggests that BOD gender faultlines are exogenous and that the subsequent
estimates are unbiased and can be reported.
To alleviate any endogeneity concerns and to make a conservative estimation, we deployed two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analyses. In
the ﬁrst-stage regression analyses, we included the instrumental variables to
predict gender faultlines strength. Two instrumental variables have been
identiﬁed as relevant and valid instruments by prior faultline studies (Cooper
et al., 2014): the proportion of male directors on the board (because a high
proportion of men on a board imply that the gender FLS may result in
a relatively weak internal alignment compared with a gender-balanced board,
thus having weak FLS) and board size (because a large board size is important
for developing more transparent and rigorous corporate governance structures
and BOD members of a large board size may need to work closely regardless
of the presence of faultlines, resulting in weaker faultlines, with strong implications for strategic change). The estimated results are used to generate the
predicted value, which was included in the second-stage regression analyses
to take account of the endogeneity effect in the analyses.

Results
Table 1 shows the correlations and descriptive statistics. The variance inﬂation
factor (VIF) values are all within an acceptable range (Aiken & West, 1991;
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001), with a maximum VIF value of 1.65, a minimum
VIF value of 1.02, and a mean VIF value of 1.20. In addition, looking at the
correlations between variables suggests that multicollinearity is not a notable

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strategic change t + 1
.00
.31 1.00
Past strategic change
.00
.29
.37 1.00
Firm size
7.63 1.17 .25 .23 1.00
Firm age
11.51 5.85
.01
.01
.07 1.00
CEO age
47.59 6.86 .04 .03
.07
.15 1.00
CEO tenure
8.40 10.78 .09 .07
.19
.28
.20 1.00
CEO ownership
.03
.10
.02
.01 .21 .16
.04 .13 1.00
BOD size
9.88 2.43 .04 .01
.18
.15
.05
.12 .16
BOD nationality
.02
.08 .03 .04
.08 .06
.02
.00 .04
heterogeneity
BOD age heterogeneity
.16
.05 .02 .01 .13 .05 .12 .07
.07
BOD educational level
.53
.20
.01 .01 .05 .10
.02 .08
.07
heterogeneity
.18
.15
.06
.08 .16 .03 .04 .08
.11
BOD functional
background
heterogeneity
BOD tenure
.67
.45 .03 .01
.26
.42
.08
.46 .27
heterogeneity
BOD gender faultline
.13
.10 .04 .03 .04
.05 .00
.00
.05
strength
Environmental complexity
.81
.70
.02
.03 .10
.03
.07
.03
.06
Environmental dynamism
.11
.10
.00 .00
.04 .13 .06 .13 .03
Environmental
1.22
.12
.01 .01 .05 .17 .11 .16 .04
muniﬁcence

Mean

1.00

9

.05

1.00
.03

10

.06

1.00

11

1.00

12

.09

.09

.01

1.00

13

1.00

14

15

16

17

.02 .01 .02 .02
.02
.03 .05 1.00
.06
.02
.00
.03 .02 .08 .05 .39 1.00
.08 .03
.05
.04
.00 .10 .02 .11 .35 1.00

.08

.01 .12 .13 .05

.00

.06 .05

.29

.00

.01
.01
.00 .02

1.00
.04

8

Note. N = 5781. All correlations above |.03| are signiﬁcant at p < .05, two-tailed. BOD = board of director.
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Table 1. Correlation Matrix, Means, and Standard Deviations.
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Table 2. Fixed-Effects Regression Models Predicting Strategic Change.
Strategic change
Model 1
B
Constant
Year dummy
Industry dummy
Past strategic change
Firm size
Firm age
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO ownership
BOD size
BOD nationality heterogeneity
BOD age heterogeneity
BOD educational level heterogeneity
BOD functional background
heterogeneity
BOD tenure heterogeneity
Inverse Mill’s ratio
BOD gender faultline strength
Environmental complexity (A)
Environmental dynamism (B)
Environmental muniﬁcence (C)
BOD gender faultline strength × A
BOD gender faultline strength × B
BOD gender faultline strength × C
Log-likelihood
Akaike information criteria
F-score (df1, df2)
Δ F-score (df1, df2)
R2
ΔR2
Prob > chi2

.49
Included
Included
.01
.08
.00
.00
.00
.01
.00
.23
.04
.10
.03

SE
.01

.01
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

Model 2
β

B
.49
Included
Included
.01
.08
.00
.00
.00
.01

.00
.91
.02
.00
.02
.01
.00 .00
.16 .23
.04 .04
.26 .10
.03 .03

SE

β

.01

.01
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00

.00
.91
.02
.00
.00
.01
.00
.16
.04
.26
.03

.01
.02
.20
.04
.80
.02

.01 .02 .01
.01 .01
.02 .03 .02
.02 .02
.01 .12 .20 .01 .12
.01 .04 .04 .01 .04
.39 .02 .29
.38 .01
.01 .01 .03
.01 .02
.21 .04 .01
4.15
1.82 .01
1.06 .05 .05
21,707.22
22,086.42
43,220.43
43,972.85
2421.19
2564.70
(96, 5684)
(99, 5681)
143.51 (99, 5681)
.9637
.9667
.003
.000
.000

Note. N = 5781. Unstandardized B-weights, standard errors, and standardized beta-weights are
reported.  p < .001,  p < .01,  p < .05 (two-tailed tests). BOD = board of director.

problem. BOD gender FLS and the three moderators were mean centered
before creating the interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991).
Table 2 reports the results including the interaction terms with three environmental context moderators. Unstandardized B-weights, standard errors,
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and standardized beta-weights are also reported in the table. In our study, we
ﬁrst use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) to evaluate the goodness of ﬁt
of our models: the smaller the AIC, the better goodness of ﬁt for a model. As
shown in Table 2 (see the bottom), the AIC of Model 2 is smaller than that of
Model 1 (AICmodel 2 = 43,972.85 < AICmodel 1 = 43,220.43), indicating
that Model 2 including three interactions increases the goodness of ﬁt over
Model 1. Furthermore, we use the log-likelihood to evaluate the goodness of
ﬁt of our models: the larger the log-likelihood, the better the goodness of ﬁt of
a model. As shown, the log-likelihood of Model 2 is larger than that of Model
1 (log-likelihoodmodel 2 = 22,086.42 > log-likelihoodmodel 1 = 21,707.22),
indicating that Model 2 including three interactions increases the goodness of
ﬁt over Model 1. In short, the results evaluating the model based on the AIC
and log-likelihood are consistent. In our study, we use R-squared as the
measure of the overall effect size for the entire model. The effect size for the
main effects model is .964, and the effect size for the interaction effects model
is .967. Moreover, we use Eta-squared as the measure of the effect size for
regression coefﬁcients. We will discuss the effect size of regression coefﬁcients in the following section. These results provide support that our
independent variable and moderators strongly improve the goodness of ﬁt of
the baseline model.
Hypothesis 1 posits that BOD gender FLS is negatively related to strategic
change. As shown in Model 1 of Table 2, the coefﬁcient of BOD gender FLS is
negative and signiﬁcant (B-weight = .20, p = .000) with a 95% conﬁdence
interval [.21, .19], and the effect size for BOD gender FLS is .123. These
results support Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 posits that the negative relationship between BOD gender FLS and strategic change will be accentuated
(attenuated) for ﬁrms competing in a low environmental complexity (high
environmental complexity) setting. As shown in Model 2 of Table 2, the
coefﬁcient of the interaction term, BOD gender FLS × environmental
complexity, is positive and signiﬁcant (B-weight = .21, p = .000) with a 95%
conﬁdence interval [.13, .29]. The effect size (i.e., Eta-squared) for the interaction term of BOD gender FLS and environmental complexity is .003.
Following Aiken and West (1991), we provided a visual of this interaction
which was plotted at plus and minus one SD for the moderator, environmental
complexity, in Figure 1. The horizontal axis represents BOD gender FLS and
the vertical axis represents the level of strategic change. The solid line
represents the effect of BOD gender FLS on strategic change under low levels
of environmental complexity, and the dashed line represents the effect of BOD
gender FLS on strategic change under high levels of environmental complexity conditions. Figure 1 shows that the association between BOD gender
FLS and strategic change is negative under low environmental complexity, but
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Figure 1. Interactive effect of board of director gender faultline strength and
environmental complexity predicting strategic change.

that effect is attenuated and, in fact, has a positive slope under high environmental complexity. These results support Hypothesis 2.
Model 2 in Table 2 reports the results testing Hypothesis 3, including the
interaction with environmental dynamism. Hypothesis 3 posits the negative
relationship between BOD gender FLS and strategic change will be accentuated
(attenuated) for ﬁrms competing in a low environmental dynamism (high
environmental dynamism) setting. As shown in Model 2 of Table 2, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term, BOD gender FLS × environmental dynamism,
is positive and signiﬁcant (B-weight = 4.15, p = .023) with a 95% conﬁdence
interval [.58, 7.71]. The effect size (i.e., Eta-squared) for the interaction term of
BOD gender FLS and environmental dynamism is .001. We provided a plot of
the interaction in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows that the association between BOD
gender FLS and strategic change is negative under low environmental dynamism, but that relationship is attenuated and has a positive slope under high
environmental dynamism. These results support Hypothesis 3.
Model 2 in Table 2 reports the results testing Hypothesis 4, including the
interaction with environmental muniﬁcence. Hypothesis 4 posits that the
negative relationship between BOD gender FLS and strategic change will be
accentuated (attenuated) for ﬁrms competing in a low environmental muniﬁcence (high environmental muniﬁcence) context. As shown in Model 2 of
Table 2, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term, BOD gender FLS × environmental muniﬁcence, is positive and signiﬁcant (B-weight = 1.06, p = .000)
with a 95% conﬁdence interval [.95, 1.17]. The effect size (i.e., Eta-Squared)
for the interaction term of BOD gender FLS and environmental muniﬁcence is
.042. Figure 3 shows that the association between BOD gender FLS and
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Figure 2. Interactive effect of board of director gender faultline strength and
environmental dynamism predicting strategic change.

Figure 3. Interactive effect of board of director gender faultline strength and
environmental muniﬁcence predicting strategic change.

strategic change is negative under low environmental muniﬁcence, but that
relationship is attenuated and has a positive slope under high environmental
muniﬁcence. These results provide support for Hypothesis 4.

Supplemental Analyses
We conducted various analyses to check the sensitivity of the results.2 One
concern is the BOD heterogeneity variables could be part of the faultline
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measure that may affect the signiﬁcant relationship between gender FLS and
the outcomes of interest as well as the interaction effect results. To address this
concern, we have conducted the analyses by including and excluding demographic heterogeneity controls and rerunning the analyses separately. First,
we reran the analyses with the models including six BOD heterogeneity
variables (BOD gender heterogeneity, nationality heterogeneity, age heterogeneity, educational level heterogeneity, functional background heterogeneity, and tenure heterogeneity). Next, we excluded BOD heterogeneity
variables from the regression models and reran the analyses. All the results are
consistent with previous ﬁndings: the effect of gender FLS is statistically
signiﬁcant; the interaction terms: BOD gender FLS × environmental complexity, BOD gender FLS × environmental dynamism, and BOD gender
FLS × environmental muniﬁcence are positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
These results together suggest that the effect of BOD gender FLS on strategic
change and the moderating of environmental contexts is robust across the
analyses including and excluding the analyses suggest that these results are
robust and provide additional supports for our hypotheses.
Another concern could be that given that many of the ﬁrms in the database
are from the same sector; it is possible that faultlines and strategic changes
could be different between industries but similar (if not very similar) within
industries. To address this concern, we implement various ways of conducting
multilevel analysis and found consistent results. Ultimately, accounting for
industry differences using 29 dummy coded variables helps to alleviate most
of this concern, but we conducted additional tests nonetheless. Speciﬁcally,
we ﬁrst use a ﬁxed-effects model with cluster–robust standard errors for
panels nested within industry. Second, we reran the analysis simply clustering
the data by industry. Moreover, we use two-level ﬁxed-effects regression by
industry with robust standard errors to rerun the models. All the results show
that the effect of gender FLS is statistically signiﬁcant; the three interaction
terms, BOD gender FLS × environmental complexity, BOD gender FLS ×
environmental dynamism, and BOD gender FLS × environmental muniﬁcence, are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant. In short, the results are
consistent across various multilevel analyses and provide additional support
for the hypotheses.3

Discussion
Theoretical Implications
The impact of upper echelons demography, which varies substantially across
ﬁrms, is a key factor to consider when investigating the determinants of
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strategic change (Triana et al., 2014; Zhang, 2006). This study supports and
extends upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) by showing that
BOD gender FLS negatively inﬂuences the level of strategic change. Upper
echelons theory proposes that top executives utilize their own ﬁlters to assess
environmental stimuli, interpret the environment, and make strategic decisions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). This information-ﬁltering process involving the top executives using their cognitive base, values, selective
perception, and interpretation to make strategic choices tends to focus on
characteristics including “age, tenure in the organization, functional background, educational level, socioeconomic roots, and ﬁnancial position.”
Hambrick and Mason (1984, p. 196). However, most upper echelon scholars
have remained agnostic with respect to subgroup dynamics through which
information sharing is facilitated or inhibited across subgroups. This study
offers a more detailed look at the effect of top executives on ﬁrm strategy and
behaviors by considering subgroup dynamics and cross-group misalignment
as well as various environmental situations. Moreover, the ﬁndings of this
study introduce three important boundary conditions (environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence) on the
assertion by upper echelons theory that the characteristics of the board inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s outcomes such as strategic change. Characteristics of leaders
in the upper echelons matter, as the theory purports, but they are much more
likely to result in strategic change in some conditions than others. This study
has shed light on this fact.
Second, this study contributes to the faultlines research by investigating the
effect of gender FLS on strategic change and its boundary conditions. Although prior studies have shown that demographic faultlines explain subgroup
dynamics more precisely and empirically reveal stronger effects on team
outcomes than demographic diversity (Bezrukova et al., 2007), less is known
about how gender faultlines of the BOD impact strategic change (Chung et al.,
2015; Meyer & Glenz, 2013). The ﬁnding in this study that BOD gender FLS
is negatively associated with strategic change under low levels of high environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence but is positively associated with strategic change under high
environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental
muniﬁcence provides some evidence for the contention that faultline research
considering external environments could beneﬁt from a richer conceptualization of boundary conditions. The implication is that faultline scholars could
provide a more complete account of the role of faultlines at the top executive
level in organizations for strategic change by considering BOD gender
faultlines as well as various types of external environmental conditions.

Wu et al.

589

Third, this study contributes to the team diversity literature by adopting
a demographic faultline lens to account for the alignment of multiple characteristics within and across gender-based subgroups in a BOD to reveal
a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of how team diversity on
the BODs impacts strategic change. Existing team diversity research has paid
less attention to the importance of team diversity for strategic change and has
remained largely ambiguous with respect to the role of the external environments (Richard et al., 2019). As a result, it is still unclear in the team
diversity literature whether or not team diversity stunts strategic change as
some reviews of the literature show (Menz, 2012; Williams & O’Reilly 1998),
or bolsters it, as other more optimistic perspectives of diversity would predict
(Cox & Blake, 1991; Richard & Shelor, 2002). The ﬁndings of this study
showing the effect of the faultline consisting of two dimensions (subgroup
cohesion and intragroup misalignment, through which strategic change is
determined) would not have been elucidated if either dimension was considered alone. The implication is that studies of BOD faultlines on strategic
change could provide a more complete account by conceptualizing team
diversity in the upper echelons in a more nuanced way, rather than
straightforward as other studies have done.
Fourth, this study contributes to leadership research. The past few decades
have witnessed a very slow increase in women within US boards, with some
saying the pace is akin to running in place (2020 Women on Boards, 2017;
Tinsley, Wade, Main, & O’Reilly, 2017). Most gains made by women on
boards have come from countries other than China and the United States,
where quotas have been implemented for women’s representation (Adams,
2016). Meanwhile, women have slowly reached a few senior leadership
positions in organizations around the world (for the United States, see Maume
Jr., 2004; Morrison, White, & Van Velsor, 1992; Smith & Parrotta, 2018; for
China, see Wall Street Journal, 2012). Recent scholarship has begun to examine how women’s presence together with men in the upper echelons
impacts ﬁrm strategy and ﬁrm outcomes (Cumming, Leung, & Rui, 2015;
Jeong & Harrison, 2017; Post & Byron, 2015; Triana et al., 2014). Given that
most leadership research has been conducted in the United States, this study
bridges the scholarly efforts by analyzing panel data of manufacturing ﬁrms in
China, the second largest economy in the world (Richard et al., 2019). The
ﬁndings of this study provide evidence to support previous research linking
BODs to ﬁrm strategy and place much emphasis on upper echelons gender
faultlines in organizations, an area that is relatively less examined in the
strategic management and corporate governance literatures than simpler
measures of gender diversity among corporate elites.
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Practical Implications
Our ﬁndings from Chinese BODs further challenge the notion that visible
diversity introduces a problem to be managed rather than a resource to be
utilized to gain a competitive advantage as Cox and Blake (1991) suggested.
The ﬁndings of this study show that board gender FLS has a negative effect on
strategic change under low levels of environmental complexity, dynamism,
and muniﬁcence, and the relationship between board gender FLS and strategic
change is positive when environmental complexity, dynamism, and muniﬁcence are high. This sends an interesting message to practitioners that under
different situations with environmental complexity, environmental dynamism,
and environmental muniﬁcence, such diversity of perspectives brought about
by board gender faultlines can make a difference in initiating strategic
changes. It will be wise for a ﬁrm to conﬁgure and reconﬁgure the members of
the top executive team taking account of different levels of environmental
complexity, dynamism, and muniﬁcence because doing so helps it to maximum the value of a diverse team consisting of multiple subgroups by
avoiding any negative effect and reaping its beneﬁts for strategic change and
behavior.
More generally, the ﬁndings also send an important message to managers in
other contexts with similar levels of environmental dynamics, environmental
complexity, and environmental muniﬁcence that a strong gender faultline
could be advantageous, at least insofar as it can initiate strategic change which
helps ﬁrms meet shifting market conditions. This implies that both men and
women should be on the board to strengthen gender faultlines that are
positively related to strategic change in times when environmental complexity, dynamism, and muniﬁcence are high, and the ﬁrm can use differing
perspectives the most. This obviously requires both men and women to be
nominated and selected for board positions (Kaczmarek, Kimino, & Pye,
2012b). To be clear, we do make assumptions about how these strategic
changes will impact ﬁnancial performance. We emphasize that the outcome of
strategic change for a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial performance may be positive, negative,
or neutral. Some studies have reported a positive effect of strategic change on
ﬁrm performance (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001), while
others have found a negative relationship (Mitchell, Shaver, & Yeung, 1992),
and still others show no relationship (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993). Strategic changes
do not always have beneﬁcial impacts on ﬁrms, although ﬁrms make them
with that intention. More importantly, strategic change or lack thereof can
be an important goal in and of itself.
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Limitations and Future Research Directions
Like many other studies, this study is not perfect which in turn points out
future research directions. First, this study focuses on gender FLS on the BOD
and its impact on strategic change, partly due to the fact that the gender
attribute better satisﬁes the criteria of the faultline measure with less confusion, as opposed to other types of attributes. Future research may also
examine other types of faultlines on BODs. Upper echelons theory suggests
that all of a manager’s demographic characteristics can be used to shape their
preferences and cognitions (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Another limitation which is also related to our faultline measure is that the
Shaw (2004) faultline measure requires that we take some continuous variables such as age and tenure and categorize them in order to create the faultline
measure. Categorizing variables that are normally continuous discards
valuable information. However, as part of the faultline measure, members of
the board are placed into discrete groups. For example, if we were dividing the
students in a class based on height and weight, we would need to determine cut
points where we call some students short versus tall and some students almost
any performance heavy versus light. If we used a continuous measure of
height and weight (or age and tenure as used in this study), instead of some
arbitrary cut point, we would end up with a number of subgroups that are equal
to the number of students in each category. Therefore, we acknowledge that
variance is lost for the age and tenure variables in the process of subgroup
formation.4
Second, while the present study uses the relational attributes (e.g., gender)
to divide a team into subgroups and calculate within-subgroup FLS, future
researches could extend it to use the task-based attributes (e.g., tenure) to
divide a team into subgroups and calculate within-group FLS to see if the
results are similar or different. Beyond task-based attributes, other types of
attributes (e.g., political beliefs and different preferences for risk-taking) may
also create faultlines on BODs.
Third, the empirical analyses are conducted using panel data derived from
China characterized by various levels of environmental complexity, environmental dynamism, and environmental muniﬁcence. Therefore, results best
generalize to that context. Future research may conduct replication studies in
different contexts to see whether the results of the impact of gender FLS and
its interaction with these environmental conditions on ﬁrm strategic change
could be generalized to other settings. Future research could also collect
multiple-country data to compare whether cross-country differences are
present.
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Fourth, future research could consider other boundary conditions. For
example, how does country culture inﬂuence the way gender faultlines on
BODs unfold? Characteristics such as power distance or gender egalitarianism
may inﬂuence the ways in which gender faultlines on BODs inﬂuence ﬁrm
outcomes. There is much work to be done to understand the impact of BOD
faultlines in not only the East but also the West. Moreover, in some countries
like Norway, quotas have been mandated or highly recommended to increase
the representation of women on BODs (Catalyst, 2014). For example,
Norway, Spain, and France all require that 40% of board seats be held by
women directors, and this is true for state-owned enterprises as well as
publicly traded ﬁrms. Israel and the Québec province of Canada require 50%
of women on the BODs for state-owned enterprises, while Finland requires
40%. Other examples include Iceland, which requires 40% of each gender be
represented on boards, and Italy, which requires 33% board membership for
the gender that is underrepresented (Catalyst, 2014). Some quotas have been
welcomed, while others have been met with resistance (Groysberg & Chen,
2016). Does increasing the representation of women on boards through quotas
make it more or less likely to create collaboration on boards where gender
faultlines are present? Future research may answer this question.
Finally, our interaction effects are statistically signiﬁcant but have mostly
small effect sizes. Given our sample size (N = 5781), we ran additional
analyses to test whether the interaction effects were driven by the large sample
size. Thus, we narrowed the sample time window to years 2013–2015, and the
sample size decreased from 5781 to 2867. Then, we reran the model. The
results are consistent with that of Table 2, and the three interactions are still
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Speciﬁcally, coefﬁcients
of the three interactions are .21 (p = .000), 5.40 (p = .027), and 1.00 (p = .000),
respectively. The effect sizes of three interactions are .002, .006, and .051,
respectively, which are larger than the previous results (.001, .003, and .042,
respectively) with the larger sample. This indicates that effect sizes get larger
(even double) when we reduce the sample size. Compared to the other two
interactions, the strongest effects were found for the BOD gender FLS ×
environmental muniﬁcence interaction, which explains a substantial amount
of variance (4.2%) for an interaction (McClelland & Judd, 1993). Therefore,
managers should pay particular attention to how much slack they have in
their environment and how that inﬂuences the effects of gender FLS on
strategic change. In summary, when the sample size is smaller, the effect sizes
increased, and the statistical signiﬁcance remained unchanged. Nevertheless,
although the pattern of moderation is signiﬁcant across the three moderators,
we acknowledge that the effect size for the moderation of complexity and
dynamism is modest relative to that of muniﬁcence.
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Conclusion
The BODs are quite possibly one of the most important types of teams in
existence. Boards have been called the “supra top management team”
(Finkelstein et al., 2009), a meta-analysis shows that boards have an impact on
ﬁrm strategy (Deutsch, 2005), and another meta-analysis shows that female
board representation positively inﬂuences strategic involvement (Post &
Byron, 2015). Decisions made at the upper echelons of organizations are
very important because they can result in millions or billions (e.g., yen, US
dollars, and euros) for the organization. Therefore, it behooves us to know
when and under what conditions board characteristics are associated with the
ability to be responsive to changing market conditions. The present study
reveals that board gender FLS is negatively associated with strategic change,
but under conditions of environmental complexity, environmental dynamism,
and environmental muniﬁcence, when the faultline perspectives may be
needed the most, this relationship is attenuated and becomes positive. We
hope this comprehensive examination of gender FLS on boards and its impact
on strategic change will be a step toward learning about faultlines and frictions
in the BOD and strategic change.
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Notes
1.

As explained in the measure of gender FLS, it consists of two factors: internal
subgroup alignment (IA) and CGAI. Given that CGAI already captures a partial
effect of gender heterogeneity, and the correlation between FLS and gender
heterogeneity is high, and the results including and excluding gender
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2.
3.
4.
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heterogeneity are almost unchanged, we do not include gender heterogeneity in
the analyses to avoid unnecessary multicollinearity. The results including gender
heterogeneity are available upon request.
Due to the space consideration, the results including BOD heterogeneity variables
are not reported in the main results but in the online supplement.
The results of these additional analyses can be found in the online supplement.
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this explanatory analogy.
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